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COMMENTS
CORPORATIONS-APPRAISAL STATUTES-ELEMENTS INVALUATION
OF CORPORATE STOCK-Statutes have been enacted in forty-five
states, the District of Columbia and the Territory of Hawaii giving
a dissenting shareholder the right to demand an impartial appraisal
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of the value of his stock in one or more of the following situations:
merger, consolidation, charter amendment, or sale of assets.1 Most
of these statutes are silent as to the meaning of value or the elements to be considered in determining value. 2 The purpose of
this comment is to consider the elements of stock valuation generally applicable under the statutory appraisal remedies, and to
analyze in some detail the interpretation of such a statute in one
jurisdiction-Delaware.

I
Recently this question was examined by the Delaware Court of
Chancery in Sporborg v. City Specialty Stores.3 In that case a group
of dissenting shareholders brought a proceeding for the appraisal
of their shares following a merger. 4 The appraiser fixed the value
of the shares at $30.61. In so doing he used the following value
elements and relative weights: (1) market value (10%), (2) earnings value (25%), (3) sales value (25%), and (4) asset value
(40%). Both the corporation and the dissenting shareholders filed
objections. On review, the court of chancery held that the appraiser erred in giving market value an independent weight since
there was no dependable market at or about the effective date of
the merger. It further held that the earnings value was miscomputed. The court found that the appraiser should have used not
the earnings of a single year but rather the average earnings over
a period of time, and it reduced the rate of capitalization from
ten to eight in light of the nature of the enterprise (retail ladies'
apparel). Sales value was held not acceptable as an independent
element of value since it was but another means of reflecting earnings value. Asset value was held correctly determined. Accordingly the court revised the appraiser's valuation of the shares to
$24.74, using only asset value, which was then weighted 40%, and
earnings value, which the court weighted at 60%.

II
Market value, net asset value, and investment value are the
three standards which have received almost unanimous recognition
1 For citations of statutes as of 1952, see 38 VA. L. REv. 915 at 915 to 931 (1952).
Since 1952 three other states have enacted appraisal statutes. See Miss. Gen. Laws (1954)
c. 201, §3 (fair market value), S.D. Sess. Laws (1955) c. 17, §7 (value at time corporate
action was authorized), and 3A Tex. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1956) §5.12 (fair value).
2 Examples of more explicit statutes are Cal. Corp. Code Ann. (Deering, 1953)
§§4300 to 4318 (fair market value); N.J. Stat. Ann. (1939) §§14:12-6, 12-7 (market value).
3 (Del. Ch. 1956) 123 A. (2d) 121.
4 Del. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 8, §262 (b).
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in statutory appraisals of stock. The relative importance of each
of these factors varies from one jurisdiction to another, and usually
depends upon what the courts deem to be the function of the
appraisal.5 Even within a given jurisdiction the proportional
weight assigned to these elements will usually be governed by the
nature of the corporation and the type of stock.
A. Market Value. Market value generally refers to the price
at which the stock was selling on the market prior to the action
which is objected to, disregarding any change in price due to the
action. 6 Delaware has held that the word "value" in its statute is
not synonymous with market value, and that while market value
is a factor to be considered, the value of the stock is not to be measured exclusively by market quotations prior to the date of the
action complained of.7 It seems that Delaware will not give a
prominent weight to market value even where quotations from a
well traded stock are available.8 Further, Delaware courts have laid
aside all consideration of market value where the merger complained of has distorted the entire market,9 or, as in the Sporborg
case, where there has been no reliable market for the stock.10
While New York has also rejected the contention that market
value alone is controlling,11 its decisions in cases where there was
a substantial market appear to have favored market value as being
presumptively controlling under the New York statutes.12
See 28 N.Y. UNIV. L. REv. 1021 at 1022 (1953).
2 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 828 (1937), points out that market value in
a more strict sense would be "utterly inapplicable," for it "reflects the influence of the
very sale or merger against which the dissenter is seeking a remedy."
7 Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 20 Del.Ch. 142, 172 A. 452 (1934); In re General Realty
&: Utilities Corp., 29 Del.Ch. 480, 52 A. (2d) 6 (1947).
8 Coe &: Co. v. Minneapolis-Moline Co., 31 Del.Ch. 368, 75 A. (2d) 244 (1950). This
decision permitted a market value weight of 45% for common stock. Other Delaware
decisions have seldom weighted market value above 30%.
9 Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del.Ch. 523, 74 A. (2d) 71 (1950); Sterling v.
Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del.Ch. 293, 93 A. (2d) 107 (1952); 38 A.L.R. (2d) 425 at
442 (1954).
10 Accord, American General Corp. v. Camp, 171 Md. 629, 190 A. 225 (1937), holding
that the court could reject the market value of preferred shares where such were not
listed and transactions in the stock were too few to have any effect.
11 See, e.g., In re Behrens, 61 N.Y.S. (2d) 179 (1946), affd. 271 App. Div. 1007, 69
N.Y.S. (2d) 910 (1946); In re Wood, 103 N.Y.S. (2d) ll0 (1951).
12 Matter of Marcus, 191 Misc. 808, 77 N.Y.S. (2d) 529 (1948), mod. 273 App. Div.
725, 79 N.Y.S. (2d) 76 at 81, affd. 302 N.Y. 881, 100 N.E. (2d) 55 (1951); In re Deutschmann, ll6 N.Y.S. (2d) 578 (1952); In re Silverman, 115 N.Y.S. (2d) 97 at 99 (1952), to
the effect that where " . . . there are actual purchases and sales of such stock in sub•
stantial volume at and near to the date as of which value is to be determined . • •
market value is controlling at least to the extent that it would take strong and convincing evidence of some other fact, as distinguished from mere opinion, to justify a
departure from it. . • ."
5

6
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In Ohio,13 New Jersey,14 · and California,15 the statute is expressly phrased in terms of "market value" or "fair market value."
Where such language appears, market value has assumed a predominant, if not determinative, role.16 Strong arguments have
been raised, however, against a heavy reliance on market value
even in the face of statutory direction in favor of fair market value.
It has been pointed out that market processes are largely psychological, and that, because of its speculative nature, market value is
frequently out of line with intrinsic worth.17
B. Net Asset Value. Net asset value is the share which the
stock represents in the value of the net assets of the corporation.
It is a value based on a hypothetical dissolution and distribution
of the corporate assets.18 The Delaware Supreme Court in TriContinental Corp. v. Battye19 has taken the position that the share
must be valued as a continuing interest in a "going: concern," since
this is what the shareholder has been deprived of by the merger
or consolidation. Such a view necessarily denies a use of liquidating value as the sole measure of valuation. Broadly speaking, net
asset value has assumed real significance (1) where, as in the Sporborg case, there has been no reliable market for the stock; 20 (2)
where, due to the nature of the corporation, market value and
asset value were virtually identical; 21 (3) where the corporation
was bordering on dissolution; 22 or (4) where the dissenting shareholders were viewed as holding stock in a company whose legal
existence had terminated, and were thus actually entitled to a distribution of its net assets.23 Several authorities on security analysis
13 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. (Page, 1954) §1701.80 (fair cash value).
14 N.J. Stat. Ann. (1939) §§14:12-6, 12-7.
15 Cal. Corp. Code Ann. (Deering; 1953) §§4300 to 4318.
16 See Prall v. U.S. Leather Co., 6 N.J. Misc. 967, 143 A. 382 (1928), affd. 105 N.J.L
646, 146 A. 916 (1929).
17 See 40 CALIF. L. REv. 140 at 144 (1952).
182 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 831 (1937).
19 31 Del.Ch. 523 at 526, 74 A. (2d) 71 (1950). See also Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 20
Del.Ch. 142, 172 A. 452 (1934). Accord, Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del.Ch. 127, 32
A. (2d) 148 (1943), where court refused to use liquidation value as the sole test in an
action to determine fairness of a merger.
20In re Fulton, 257 N.Y. 487, 178 N.E. 766 (1931).
21 In re General Realty &: Utilities Corp., 29 Del.Ch. 480, 52 A. (2d) 6 (1947), where
assets consisted of one-third cash and two-thirds securities.
22 Allaun v. Consolidated Oil Co., 16 Del.Ch. 318, 147 A. 257 (1929).
23American General Corp. v. Camp, 171 Md. 629 at 637, 190 A. 225 (1937): "The
owner of shares of stock in a corporation whose legal existence is at an end would be
entitled to receive the aliquot proportion • . . in the distribution of the net amount
of corporate funds in which his particular kind of stock would be entitled to share."
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have recommended that asset value should at best be a secondary
consideration to investment (i.e., earnings, dividend) value.24
Delaware has recognized that net asset value may not properly
be omitted as a value factor in an appraisal proceeding.25 In practice, the relative weight given to asset value has been largely related
to the nature of the corporation's business. Typically, net asset
value has been weighted as high as 50% in the case of an investments and property holding company26 and as low as 20% for an
ordinary manufacturing company.27 A net asset value weight of
40% was approved in the Sporborg case where the merging corporation was in the women's specialty sales business. The court
stressed that the firm's investment and expansion policies accounted
for the relatively heavy weight accorded asset value.28 In ascertaining asset value, Delaware has approved recourse to reproduction cost rather than original cost, apparently allowing appraisers
a discretionary choice between the alternative methods.29
C. Investment Value. Investment value is an estimate of
present worth in light of past, present, and prospective financial
records of the company. If the court takes the view, as does
Delaware, that a shareholder is being deprived of his proportional
share in a "going concern" in which he might otherwise continue
to share in its earnings and dividends in the indefinite future, it
would seem that investment value would most appropriately reflect
this earnings and dividends loss.30 Earnings are usually the key
24 "In the case of stocks, however, earning power [must be] put ahead of the value
of the assets. The return to stockholders is contingent on the net earnings per share
• • • the primary purpose . • • is to avoid buying issues that are apt to fail." D1'.CE AND
EITEMAN, THE STOCK MARKET, 3d ed., 417 (1952). Cf. GRAHAM AND DODD, SECURITY
.ANALYSIS, 3d ed., 477 to 478 (1951); 40 CAI.IF. L. REV. 140 (1952).
25 See Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del.Ch. 293 at 308, 93 A. (2d) 107
(1952); 38 A.L.R. (2d) 425 at 442 (1954).
26 In re General Realty &: Utilities Corp., 29 Del.Ch. 480, 52 A. (2d) 6 (1947).
27 Heller v. Munsingwear, 33 Del.Ch. 593, 98 A. (2d) 774 (1953) (established manufacturer of hosiery, underclothing, and sleeping wear). See Coe &: Co. v. MinneapolisMoline Co., 31 Del.Ch. 368, 75 A. (2d) 244 (1950).
28 (Del.Ch. 1956) 123 A. (2d) 121 at 127: "However, I believe the asset value element
must be given somewhat greater weight here because, for some time, Opcol was using
more than an average amount of its assets to expand and improve its business activities
and much of this was not yet reflected in earnings."
29 Heller v. Munsingwear, 33 Del.Ch. 593 at 596, 98 A. (2d) 774 (1953). This seems
to make it clear that net asset value is not necessarily synonymous with book value,
though the court did take account of obsolescence by reducing the weight of net asset value.
30 See I DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS, 5th ed., 287 (1953): " ••• in
spite of practical difficulty ••• the capitalization of earnings is the only means .•• for
determining the value of a going business." Dudley v. Mealey, (2d Cir. 1945) 147 F.
(2d) 268 at 270 (citing cases): "The Supreme Court has several times said that the best
test of the value of a going commercial enterprise is its earning capacity."
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factor in value and are what the dissenting shareholder surrenders.31 Further, it is generally true that the trend of market prices
is to a high degree dependent on the pattern of earnings.32
In calculating investment value, it is necessary (I) to establish
an earnings figure and (2) to select an appropriate rate of capitalization. 33 In the Sporborg decision the Delaware court disapproved
the appraiser's use of earnings derived only from the fiscal year
immediately preceding the effective date of the merger, expressing
its preference for an averaging of earnings over a reasonable period
of time. 34 Delaware has also approved of the use of estimated
future income rather than actual past earnings as a base for capitalization.35 In regard to the rate of capitalization, close attention
must be paid to the characteristics of the particular corporation,
comparing each corporation's rate of earnings with those of other
similarly situated enterprises. Recent Delaware cases have approved capitalization rates that are "within the range of reason," 36
and the Sporborg case used the classifications of Mr. Dewing as a
general guide to reasonableness.37
Though most jurisdictions recognize investment value as applicable in appraisal proceedings,38 few have given this element
particular emphasis, and only Delaware appears to have accorded
it a consistently significant position. The first mention by the Delaware courts of the role of investment value was in Allied Chemical
31 Cf. DoWRIE AND FULLER, INVESTMENTS, 2d ed., 512 (1950); GRAHAM AND DODD,
SECURITY ANALYSIS, 3d ed., 410 to 4ll (1951); Bonbright, "The Problem of Judicial
Valuation," 27 CoL. L. REv. 493 at 522 (1927).
32D1CE AND EITEMAN, THE STOCK MARKET, 3d ed., p. 417 (1952). See 40 CALIF. L.
REv. 140 at 144, 145 (1952): "In stripping the market value of its unfairness courts are
in reality finding investment value. In reason, this should be so, for if the market were
an unemotional, purely logical organism it would reflect only the investment value of
securities."
33 For a sampling of many of the factors entering into investment value, see 16
BROOKLYN L. R.Ev. 86 (1950) and 24 TULANE L. REv. 464 (1950).
34 (Del.Ch. 1956) 123 A. (2d) 121 at 124, 125. The court relied upon In re General
Realty & Utilities Corp., 29 Del.Ch. 480, 52 A. (2~) 6 (1947), and 1 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 253 (1937), recommending a three to five year earnings figure. See
also Coe & Co. v. Minneapolis-Moline, 31 Del.Ch. 368, 75 A. (2d) 244 (1950) and Heller
v. Munsingwear, 33 Del.Ch. 593, 98 A. (2d) 774 (1953), where five year earning periods
were approved.
35 In re General Realty & Utilities Corp., 29 Del.Ch. 480, 52 A. (2d) 6 (1947).
36 See Coe & Co. v. Minneapolis-Moline, 31 Del.Ch. 368, 75 A. (2d) 244 (1950) and
Heller v. Munsingwear, 33 Del.Ch. 593, 98 A. (2d) 774 (1953) where multipliers of 5 and
7, respectively, were approved.
37 1 DEWING, FINANCIAL POUCY OF CORPORATIONS, 5th ed., 390 (1953), cited in Cottrell v. Pawcatuck Co., (Del.Ch. 1955) ll6 A. (2d) 787 at 791 (multiplier of 7 or 8
approved for manufactUTer having large assets).
38 See In re Belrrens, 61 N.Y.S. (2d) 179 (1946), affd. 271 App. Div. 1007, 69 N.Y.S.
(2d) 910 (1946); In re Northwest Greyhound Lines, 41 Wash. (2d) 672, 251 P. (2d) 607
(1952). See also 38 A.L.R. (2d) 442 at 466 (1954).
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and Dye Corp. v. Steel and Tube Co.,39 where the court held that
earning power controls over replacement cost. In 1947, the court
of chancery approved a weight of 25 % for earnings and dividends
value in appraising the stock of an investment company,40 and in
1950 expressed satisfaction with a weight of 30% to 35% for the
same factors in the case of a manufacturing company.41 Subsequently, in 1953, the court increased the influence of the dividend
and earnings factors from 45% to 50% in the case of an ordinary
manufacturing corporation.42 A further extension of the Delaware
courts' reliance on investment value is seen in the Sporborg case
where investment value is given a final weight of 60% by the court
with the indication that it would have received greater consideration but for certain special circumstances.43

III
The question naturally arises as to what justification there is
for the weighting which finally is assigned to the value elements in
a given case. Initially, of course, the weights are assigned in the
discretion of the appraiser who, in Delaware, is appointed by the
court of chancery.44 Prior to 1943 it seemed that neither the Delaware Court of Chancery nor the federal district court had the
power to compel appraisers to modify their decisions as to the value
of stock.45 Since 1943, however, exceptions to the appraiser's report have been heard before the chancery court on both the law
and the facts, and the court has determined the final value and
directed payment.46 The court has held that the appraiser should
state the value of the elements given independent weight and the
weight given to each in reaching the appraised value,47 and it has
felt free to make "such modifications as may be dictated." 48 In
3914 Del.Ch. 64, 122 A. 142 (1923) (an action to enjoin the sale of assets).
(1947).
(1950).
42 Heller v. Munsingwear, 33 Del.Ch. 593, 98 A. (2d) 774 (1953).
43 Note 28 supra.
44 Del. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 8, §262 (e). In some jurisdictions the appraiser is chosen
by the parties themselves or the court makes the appraisal. See 38 VA. L. REv. 915 at
930 (1952).
45 Root v. York Corp., (D.C. Del. 1944) 56 F. Supp. 288 [under Del. Rev. Code
(1935) §2093]. However, the state court could refuse to order the dissenting shareholders to deliver over their shares.
46 Del. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 8, §262 (f).
47 Coe &: Co. v. Minneapolis-Moline, 31 Del.Ch. 368 at 372, 75 A. (2d) 244 (1950).
48 In r_e General Realty &: Utilities Corp., 29 Del.Ch. 480 at 490, 52 A. (2d) 9 (1947),
quoting Application of Behrens, 61 N.Y.S. (2d) 179 at 182 (1946), affd. 271 App. Div.
1007, 69 N.Y.S. (2d) 910 (1946).
40 In re General Realty &: Utilities Corp., 29 Del.Ch. 480, 52 A. (2d) 6
41 Coe &: Co. v. Minneapolis-Moline Co., 31 Del.Ch. 368, 75 A. (2d) 244
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deciding whether changes should be made the court has taken the
general position that the elements and weights assigned by the
appraiser will be sustained if they are not "arbitrary or unreasonable."49 The presumption in favor of the appraiser's determination,
however, is at best a tenuous one, for the chancery court's determination of what weights are not arbitrary or reasonable appears
to be highly discretionary5° and predictable, if at all, only by reference to prior cases with analogous facts.

IV
It appears from the foregoing that the function of an appraisal
has been held by the Delaware courts to be compensation of a dissenting shareholder for his loss in a "going concern." In measuring the present worth of this lost right, the Sporborg decision apparently reflects a trend of increasing judicial approval of a greater
role for investment (including earnings and dividends) value in
statutory appraisal proceedings.51 It seems that such a trend has
the dual desirability of diminishing the role of the many speculative factors found in market value and of avoiding excessive treatment of the appraisal as primarily a liquidation proceeding which
seems contrary to valuation on a "going concern" basis52 and inconsistent with the expectations of the average stockholder in
making his investment. This is not to suggest that market value and
asset value are irrelevant to a meaningful valuation or to say that
these elements may not often be of great significance. The weight
given to any value factor will always be closely related to the nature
of the corporation and the character of the stock. It is felt, however, that investment value is the most realistic measure of the
interest which the dissenting shareholqer has lost in a "going concern" as a result of the merger, consolidation, amendment, or sale
of assets.53
John C. Baity
49 Coe & Co.

v. Minneapolis-Moline, 31 Del.Ch. 368 at 374, 75 A. (2d) 6 (1950).
Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del.Ch. 101 at 115, 66 A. (2d) 910 (1949):
"Any weighting of the factors is, of course, arbitrary. • • ."
51 It is interesting to note that the increasing reliance by the Delaware courts on
investment value has apparently not been affected by the nature of the enterprise. See
notes 39 to 43 supra.
52 See 2 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 831 to 834 (1937).
53 See id. at 834: "Value based on hypothetical market value of a continuing investment ••• should become the prevailing [standard], subject to modifications in special
cases." Cf. In re Fulton, 257 N.Y. 487, 178 N.E. 766 (1931).
50 Tri-Continental

